ABTL Report - Fall 2026 Edition - Flipbook - Page 6
ABTL - Los Angeles
Fall 2026
OVERVIEW OF THE WORKERS’
COMPENSATION SYSTEM
supra, ¶ 15:508.) The public policy behind the workers’
compensation system—a speci昀椀c form of the Hobbesian social
contract known as the workers’ compensation “bargain”—is
that an employer assumes liability for employees’ industrial
injuries without regard to fault in exchange for limitations on
the amount of liability. (Shoemaker v. Myers (1990) 52 Cal.3d
1, 16.) Employees then receive payment of bene昀椀ts more
quickly without having to prove their employer’s fault but, in
exchange, employees relinquish the larger range of damages
that may be available in tort. (Ibid.)
This article provides an overview of
California’s workers’ compensation
system for general civil practitioners.
It focuses on how the workers’
compensation system intersects with
the tort system and the common
challenges and procedural pitfalls
relating to that intersection.
Brad Pauley
II. In a civil action, the defendant employer generally
bears the burden of pleading and proving workers’
compensation exclusivity as an af昀椀rmative defense.
I. The Workers’ Compensation
Act provides an exclusive remedy
for job-related injuries when the
conditions of compensation are met.
When sued in tort, the defendant employer generally bears
the burden of pleading and proving workers’ compensation
exclusivity as an af昀椀rmative defense. (Gibbs v. American
Airlines, Inc. (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1, 11 (Gibbs); Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Superior Court (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1273,
1283–1284.) An exception to that rule exists, however, when
the plaintiff’s civil complaint alleges facts indicating workers’
compensation coverage. In such cases, the employer is
relieved of pleading requirements for raising exclusivity as an
af昀椀rmative defense. (Gibbs, at p. 11; Coca-Cola Bottling, at p.
1285.) In Gibbs, the court held that where the former employee
alleged facts establishing an employment relationship and
injuries arising from the course of employment, the employer
was not required to prove at trial that it had purchased workers’
compensation insurance to successfully assert the exclusivity
defense. (Gibbs, at p. 11.)
California’s Workers’ Compensation
Act (the Act) is a statutory system
of remedies for job-related injuries.
The Act provides employees the sole
and exclusive remedy against their
Emma Wine
employers for on-the-job injuries
if the “conditions of compensation” exist, subject to certain
exceptions. (Lab. Code, § 3602, subd. (a).) The “conditions of
compensation” are (1) at the time of injury both the employee
and employer are subject to the Act, (2) at the time of injury the
employee is performing services arising out of and incidental
to his or her employment and is acting within the course of his
or her employment, and (3) the injury is proximately caused
by the employment. (Lab. Code, § 3600, subd. (a)(1)–(3);
Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation (The
Rutter Group 2025) ¶ 15:507.) If these conditions are met, the
employee may not bring a civil action against the employer
because the Act provides exclusive jurisdiction to the Workers’
Compensation Appeals Board (WCAB). (Chin et al., supra,
¶ 15:505.) The Act should be liberally construed to extend
coverage for workers’ injuries, which means it likewise should
be construed broadly to bar tort claims against an employer
even if the employee is seeking to avoid the jurisdiction of the
WCAB in order to pursue possible tort remedies. (2 Eskenazi,
Cal. Civil Practice: Workers’ Compensation, § 15:1.)
Importantly, evidence of the defendant employer’s workers’
compensation insurance coverage has been held unnecessary
to establishing an exclusivity defense. As the California Court
of Appeal noted in Gibbs, “[p]roof of insurance coverage is not
expressly listed as a ‘condition of compensation’ prerequisite
to application of workers’ compensation provisions. Instead,
the relevant condition of compensation is that, ‘at the time of
the injury, both the employer and the employee are subject to
the compensation provisions’ of workers’ compensation law.”
(Gibbs, supra, 74 Cal.App.4th at pp. 11–12, quoting Lab. Code,
§ 3600, subd. (a)(1).) Gibbs went on to express skepticism that
courts even should allow jurors to hear evidence of workers’
compensation insurance coverage. (Gibbs, at p. 12.)
The Act creates strict liability for workplace injuries where
the conditions of compensation are satis昀椀ed; an employee
does not need to prove fault on the part of the employer.
(Chin et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Employment Litigation,
Continued on Page 7
6
